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Constructing a New Theoretical
Framework for Home
Improvement Financing
James Hogan told his story as follows:
In April of 1989 I was contacted on the phone by a repre-
sentative of a company called Loan Originators. This person
told me they could arrange to have repairs done to my
house. . . . The repairs that were to be made on my house
included roofing work on my house and carport and installing
fascia boards. The cost was $6200.00.
At the time we signed [the loan] documents, we owned our
house and there was over $50,000.00 equity in our house.
Though I signed the documents given to me by [the mortgage
company], I did not understand them. The total loan was for
$12,916.50....
After we signed the documents, ... some work was per-
formed by the home improvement company. The work that
was performed on our house was not completed and the work
that was done was substandard and defective. As it turned
out, we owed a great deal of money for little or no service.
The representations made to me by the home improvement
company that they would do a good job for me and make re-
pairs to our house were false.
* * * I was unable to keep up the mortgage payments and
Fleet foreclosed on us in December of 1991. Fleet purchased
the house at the foreclosure sale and was in the process of
evicting me when I went to an attorney .... I still live in the
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house even though it is now owned by Fleet.'
U nder current federal law, Hogan should not have lost his
home to foreclosure. Hogan had a valid defense to pay-
ment of the debt based on the contractor's failure to substantially
complete the home improvements.2 Had the issue been litigated,
Hogan would not have been required to pay the debt nor would
the lender have been permitted to foreclose. Unfortunately,
most states currently put the burden on the homeowner to sue to
prevent foreclosure by asserting defenses to payment. In addi-
tion, the homeowner must plead and prove nonperformance of
the home improvement contract as a defense to payment.3
In this Article, I advocate modification of the law governing
home improvement financing. In section I, I discuss the preva-
lence of home improvement scams, the dual system of home im-
provement financing available to affluent and poor homeowners,
and the social cost of home improvement scams. Despite at-
tempts by lawmakers to protect homeowners from unscrupulous
home improvement contractors and lenders, home improvement
scams remain a significant consumer problem. Most victims of
such scams are poor, minority, and elderly homeowners. These
homeowners obtain home improvements and home improve-
ment financing through a system with tremendous potential for
abuse. In this system, contractors and lenders use high pressure
tactics and fraud to induce homeowners into disadvantageous
home improvement transactions. Ultimately, victims of home
improvement scams may, like the Hogans, lose their homes.
In section II, I discuss the application of negotiable instru-
ments law to home improvement loans. The Federal Trade Com-
mission adopted its Holder in Due Course Rule' to ameliorate
some of the harshness of negotiable instruments law in consumer
transactions. Other state and federal measures are also designed
to protect consumers who borrow to improve their homes. In
1 Adding Injury to Injury: Credit on the Fringe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Ur-
ban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-56 (1993) [hereinafter House Consumer Credit
Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of James R. Hogan, Sr.).
2 See infra part II.B.
3 See infra part III.A. The homeowner has the burden of pleading as well as the
burden of proof. However, because the burden of proof is a more significant burden
than the burden of pleading, see infra note 117, I will refer only to the burden of
proof in this Article except where a discussion of the burden of pleading is
necessary.
4 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1996).
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sections III and IV, I explain why these measures have not been
sufficient to eliminate abuse by home improvement contractors
and lenders. In cases of abuse, a homeowner who has executed a
promissory note to evidence the obligation to pay a home im-
provement loan must prove defenses to payment. In most states,
the homeowner also must initiate a lawsuit against the lender to
enjoin foreclosure because foreclosure without judicial hearing is
permitted.' The burden of initiating suit is particularly onerous
because a suit to obtain an injunction is likely to be expensive
and require the assistance of an attorney.6 Placing these burdens
on the homeowner is not appropriate when a relationship be-
tween the contractor and the home improvement lender exists
because this circumstance increases the likelihood of a defense to
payment. Therefore, in section V, I recommend prohibiting
promissory notes and power of sale foreclosure in home im-
provement loans made by lenders who have a relationship to the
contractor. This measure would shift the burdens of proof and
initiating suit to the lenders.
I
THE HOME IMPROVEMENT FINANCING DILEMMA
A. Home Improvement Scams
Home improvement scams have been a major consumer prob-
lem for decades.7 Consumer advocates have recommended solu-
5 See infra part IV.B.
6 See infra part IV.C.2.
7 See Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Promulgation of Trade
Regulation Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,511
(1975) [hereinafter Statement of Basis and Purpose]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 50 (1967). In 1965, the National Better
Business Bureau reported that fraud and deception in connection with home repairs
or improvements had been its most frequent consumer complaint since 1953. Id.
(citing NATIONAL BET-ER BUSINESS BUREAU, SERVICE BULLETIN No. 363 (1965)).
The National Better Business Bureau estimated that fraudulent and deceptive prac-
tices relating to home repairs and improvements cost consumers $500 million to $1
billion each year during that period. Id.
The news media have reported on the various scams and their victims over the
years. See, e.g., Carol Agus, Nightmare, Not a Dream House, NEWSDAY, Nov. 15,
1992, at 11; Mike McClintock, Right from the Start; The Most Important Remodeling
Decision Comes Early, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at T7; Ways Con Men Cash in
on the Energy Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1977, at 58. A recent
motion picture chronicled the antics of two "tin men" who used various fraudulent
schemes to sell aluminum siding in the early 1960s. TIN MEN (TriStar Pictures 1987).
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tions, and both state and federal legislators and regulators have
attempted to address the problem.8 Despite the work of con-
sumer advocates and lawmakers, home improvement scams re-
main a major consumer problem today. In recent years,
complaints about home improvement companies have made up a
substantial portion of the complaints received by Better Business
Bureaus around the nation. 9 Furthermore, a recent survey of
legal aid attorneys indicates that the incidence of home improve-
ment and home improvement lending scams is significant."°
Not all home improvement scams involve a home improve-
ment loan; some perpetrators of home improvement fraud work
only for cash.'1 However, most homeowners must borrow to pay
for significant home improvements. Lenders reporting under the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 2 originated more than one mil-
lion home improvement loans in 199413 and just under one mil-
lion home improvement loans in 1995.1' In 1993, congressional
hearings addressed the problem of predatory lending, 15 which is
to a great extent a problem of home improvement lending. 6
8 See infra part II.
9 Complaints about home improvement companies ranked second in 1993 and
1994. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, ANNUAL INQUIRY AND COM-
PLAINT SUMMARY 3 (1994); COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, ANNUAL IN-
QUIRY AND COMPLAINT SUMMARY 3 (1993). The 1995 Annual Inquiry and
Complaint Summary, the most recent available, does not list complaints by business
group but does indicate that home improvement companies continue to generate a
significant portion of complaints received. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BU-
REAUS, ANNUAL INQUIRY AND COMPLAINT SUMMARY 16-22 (1995).
10 PUBLIC CrrIZEN, STEALING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SURVEY OF LEGAL AID
ATTORNEYS ON ABUSIVE HOME EOUITY LENDING 20 (1994).
11 For example, a con artist may offer to seal cracks in a homeowner's driveway
for a bargain price to be paid in advance, then may spread oil or water on the drive-
way and leave. Elliot H. McCleary, How to Avoid Home-Repair Rip-Offs, CONSUM-
ERS DIG., March 1993, at 30.
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994).
13 81 FED. RESERVE BULL. A68, tbl. 4.36 (Sept. 1995). Home improvement loans
constituted more than 14% of reported home mortgage loans in 1994. Id.
14 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. A68, tbl. 4.36 (Sept. 1996). Home improvement loans
constituted more than 16% of reported home mortgage loans originated in 1995. Id.
15 Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending Discrimina-
tion, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [here-
inafter Senate Banking Comm. Hearings]; House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hear-
ing, supra note 1.
16 See, e.g., Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 291-92 (statement
of Eva Davis), 292-94 (statement of Annie Diggs), 313, 315 (statement of Kathleen
Keest et al., National Consumer Law Center), 451 (letter from Elizabeth Bradford
& Maria Tepper, Ass't Attorneys General, State of New York, to Sen. Donald W.
1098 [Vol. 75, 1996]
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing
Contractors, finance companies, second mortgage companies,
and mortgage brokers are the perpetrators of home improve-
ment loan scams. 7 Minorities, the elderly, and the inner-city and
rural poor are most often the victims.' 8 Contractors, lenders, and
mortgage brokers seek these particularly vulnerable homeown-
ers. They may solicit door-to-door in low income neighborhoods,
or they may target only the owners of homes that are in particu-
lar need of repair. 9 Victims usually have substantial equity in
their homes due to rising real estate values or reduction of
purchase money debt but, because of their low or fixed incomes,
must borrow to make needed home repairs.2"
Upon finding a likely target for a predatory home improve-
ment loan, a contractor, lender, or broker may use high pressure
tactics or outright fraud to induce the homeowner to enter a
home improvement contract and abusive loan transaction.2
These parties may misrepresent the home improvements to be
performed, the quality of the improvements, the price of the im-
provements, or the terms of the home improvement loan.22 They
may pressure a homeowner to sign loan documents without read-
ing them or with key terms left blank, or forge a homeowner's
Riegle, Jr. (Mar. 9, 1993)), 460 (report by New York City Dept. of Consumer Af-
fairs); House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of
James R. Hogan, Sr.).
17 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 315-16 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, National Consumer Law Center); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT EN-
HANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1993, S. REP. No. 169, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; Julia P. Forrester, Mort-
gaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Pro-
motion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 387 (1994).
18 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 254 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts), 315 (statement
of Kathleen Keest, National Consumer Law Center).
19 See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help
Second-Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1476,
1478-79 (1993). Eva Davis, a San Francisco homeowner, believes she was targeted
because the City of San Francisco placed a yellow tag on her house after it sustained
damage in the 1989 earthquake. Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at
291 (statement of Eva Davis).
20 Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (letter to Sen. Donald
W. Riegle, Jr. from William E. Morris, Director of Litigation, Southern Arizona
Legal Aid, Inc.); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 22.
21 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 309 (statement of Scott




signature. 23 The loan documents often require the homeowner
to pay an exorbitant interest rate and excessive closing costs, and
they frequently include other unfair terms.24 Documents may
even require larger payments than the homeowner's income can
support.25 Finally, contractors often induce homeowners to sign
completion certificates before work has even begun so that loan
funds will be released immediately.26
Home improvements performed by perpetrators of home im-
provement scams are often never completed. Those improve-
ments that are completed tend to be substandard and contractors
often use low-quality materials.27 In some cases the work may be
so poor that it actually reduces the value of the home. 28 Never-
theless, contractors may be paid for their substandard work when
they sell the homeowner's payment obligation to a lender or
when a lender advances funds directly to the contractor prior to
satisfactory completion of the work. Once contractors have been
paid in connection with a series of transactions, they often
change their corporate identities or move to another state, mak-
ing them difficult to sue. 29 Lenders may ignore homeowners'
23 See id.
24 See House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 73-75 (state-
ment of Bruce Marks, Executive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corpo-
ration). Homeowners may pay interest rates in excess of 39%, Jack Meyers et al.,
Firm Wrote Loans at 39% Interest, B. HERALD, June 17, 1991, at 1, 20, reprinted in
House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 116, and points totaling
as much as 33% of the amount financed, Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra
note 15, at 447 (letter to Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr. from Elizabeth Renuart, Manag-
ing Attorney, St. Ambrose Legal Services). Predatory home improvement loans
may also have other unfair terms, such as high prepayment fees that make refinanc-
ing prohibitively expensive, House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note
1, at 66-68 (statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc.), balloon
payments that may be due within a year or two after the loan is closed, Senate Bank-
ing Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Attor-
ney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts), and mandatory refinancing of
existing first mortgages that carry lower interest rates, id. at 447 (letter to Sen. Don-
ald W. Riegle, Jr. from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Attorney, St. Ambrose Legal
Services).
25 See House Consumer Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 50 (statement
of Richard F. Syron, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
26 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 309 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts); PUBLIC CITI-
ZEN, supra note 10, at 6.
27 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 461 (report by New
York City Dept. of Consumer Affairs).
28 Id.
29 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10, at 22.
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complaints of unfinished or poor quality home improvements.30
Lenders may enforce a homeowner's debt regardless of a defense
to payment, and homeowners often know no better themselves.
Ultimately, homeowners may pay for substandard or incomplete
improvements or, worse, may lose their homes.
B. Dual Systems
While many poor homeowners are victimized by home im-
provement loan scams, more affluent homeowners obtain home
improvements and home improvement financing through an en-
tirely different system. While poor, minority, and elderly home-
owners deal with door-to-door solicitors who offer an all-in-one
package of improvements and financing, homeowners in middle
or upper income neighborhoods are more likely to seek out repu-
table contractors, obtain several bids for the desired work, and
independently secure financing on the best terms available. The
advantages of the latter course are clear. By obtaining references
and seeking bids from several contractors, homeowners are more
likely to find a reliable contractor. When homeowners obtain fi-
nancing from a lender with no relationship to the contractor,
funds are less likely to be advanced unless the work is progress-
ing. A home improvement lender can confirm that improve-
ments are being performed as advances are made 3 -something
an independent lender is much more likely to do.
One reason this dual system exists is that homeowners targeted
by scam artists lack sophistication. 2 Another reason is that
these homeowners lack the alternatives available to upper- and
middle-income homeowners. While plenty of reputable contrac-
tors are willing to work in upper and middle income neighbor-
hoods, less reputable contractors who solicit door-to-door
predominate in low income communities.33 Mainstream lenders
make home improvement loans in upper and middle income
neighborhoods, but finance companies and second mortgage
30 See, e.g., Agus, supra note 7, at 11.
31 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 316 (statement of Kath-
leen Keest, National Consumer Law Center).
32 Kathleen Keest, Some of the Poor Pay Even More: Is There a "Discrimination
Tax" in the Marketplace, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 365 (1993). Scam artists target
the poor and minorities because they are perceived as being vulnerable. Id. at 366.
33 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 462-63 (report by New
York City Dept. of Consumer Affairs). Some reputable contractors may even refuse
to work in poor neighborhoods. Id. at 466.
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companies that charge high interest rates are sometimes the only
lenders who will make such loans in low income neighbor-
hoods.3 4 Low income homeowners thus do not usually have the
opportunity to obtain home improvements or home improve-
ment financing from reputable companies.
C. Social Cost of Home Improvement Scams
Homeowners victimized by home improvement scams may pay
for home improvements they do not receive or, if they refuse to
pay, may lose their homes to foreclosure. When homeowners
pay for substandard home improvements, they may sustain a sub-
stantial loss. Because home improvement costs tend to be high
in relation to other expenses, a significant amount of money can
be involved. Poor homeowners, who are the most frequent vic-
tims, are those least able to afford such a loss.
Homeowners who lose their homes as a result of home im-
provement scams may be both financially and psychologically
devastated. Financially, a homeowner may lose remaining equity
in a home, may face a deficiency judgment in some states, or
both. 5 In addition, homeowners must deal with intense psycho-
logical pressure. Homeowners facing loss of a home are more
likely to confront physical and mental illness, suicide, crime, and
family problems.3 6 Forced dislocation from a home, even with-
out any corresponding financial difficulties, may result in sad-
ness, depression, psychological distress, sleep loss, anger, and
idealization of the lost home. 7 Homeowners who lose their
34 Id. While mainstream lenders that lend money at market rates tend to shun
inner-city neighborhoods occupied by poor and minority homeowners, these lenders
have provided financing to predatory lenders or have purchased high interest rate
loans from them. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 308 (state-
ment of Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts);
Forrester, supra note 17, at 421-22.
35 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
36 See Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 276 (1983) (statement of John J.
Sheehan, Director of Legislation, United Steelworkers of America).
37 See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation,
in THE URBAN CONDITION (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963), reprinted in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359-61 (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1966). This study dealt with urban slum dwellers displaced by urban renewal in Bos-
ton. The psychological effects on homeowners who lose their homes to foreclosure
are likely to be at least as severe. While many of the slum dwellers in the study
moved to better home environments, id. at 370-76, homeowners displaced by fore-
closure are likely to see a decrease in the quality of their housing.
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homes because of foreclosure may end up homeless, but even for
those who obtain alternative housing, the loss of their home is
devastating.38
II
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND
CONSUMER CREDIT
Home improvement scams have a high social cost relative to
other consumer problems,39 but the issues that arise in home im-
provement financing are, to a great extent, similar to other con-
sumer credit issues. Sellers of goods and services to consumers
on credit take advantage of legal rules designed for an entirely
different setting. In many states, sellers may document a con-
sumer's payment obligation with a negotiable promissory note
governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
A presumption of consideration thus arises and shifts to the con-
sumer the burden to prove deficiencies in the seller's perform-
ance.4" In addition, until 1976, sellers could transfer a
consumer's promissory note to a holder in due course41 who took
the note free from personal defenses.42
A. Historical Perspective
1. Early History
A full understanding of negotiable instruments law requires
some familiarity with the history of negotiable instruments. Bills
of exchange, the first negotiable instruments, were used in inter-
national trade as early as the fourteenth century.43 By the late
eighteenth century, bills of exchange were used as an unofficial
currency among merchants because the only legal tender at the
38 Forrester, supra note 17, at 386-87. Homeowners who lose their homes also
have psychological pressure resulting from the financial difficulties associated with
foreclosure. See id.
39 See supra part I.C.
40 See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
41 U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1966). A holder in due course of an instrument is a holder
who takes the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain mat-
ters, including a defense against it or a claim to it. U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (1990).
42 See infra notes 61-65.
43 James S. Rogers, The Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265,284 (1990). A
bill of exchange, also called a draft, is an order or direction to pay made by a drawer
upon a drawee. See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(6), 3-104(a), (e) (1990); U.C.C. §§ 3-102(1)(b),
3-104 (1966). For a discussion of other early uses of negotiable instruments see Rog-
ers, supra, at 291.
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time was coins." Bills of exchange permitted the assignment of
debts at a time when contracts and debts were otherwise
unassignable.45
Courts recognized the negotiability of bills of exchange as
early as the beginning of the eighteenth century.4 6 Characteris-
tics of negotiability were transferability, a presumption of consid-
eration, and the availability of holder in due course status for a
holder. 7 The latter two characteristics facilitated transferability
of bills of exchange.4" Since bills of exchange passed from
merchant to merchant in a series of transfers, the ultimate hold-
ers might have no knowledge of the original transaction or the
earlier transfers.4 9 The holder in due course doctrine arose from
the need to protect transferees of a negotiable instrument, even
though the obligor or prior holders of the instrument might be
harmed. 0 The presumption of consideration served a similar
purpose.
Promissory notes came into use much later than bills of ex-
change-near the end of the seventeenth century.51 Although
promissory notes were frequently assigned in the eighteenth cen-
tury, 2 it was only in the nineteenth century that they were
treated as fully negotiable in the United States. 3 At the time of
the development of negotiable instruments law, few notes were
given as consideration for the purchase of goods and services.5 4
4Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 612 (1981); Rog-
ers, supra note 43, at 272; Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (1971).
45 Rogers, supra note 43, at 275-76 (quoting JOHN B. BYLES, THE LAW OF BILLS &
EXCHANGE 2 (8th ed.)).
46 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 213 (1977).
47 See 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113-14 (1926); Rogers,
supra note 43, at 275-76; James S. Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recogni-
tion, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197, 199 (1987).
48 See Gilmore, supra note 44, at 612-13; Rogers, supra note 43, at 272, 275-76;
Rogers, supra note 47, at 199.
49 Gilmore, supra note 44, at 612-13.
50 Id. at 613.
51 HORWITZ, supra note 46, at 213-14. A promissory note is an unconditional
promise to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest, that is payable to
order or to bearer, is payable on demand or at a definite time, and does not state any
other undertaking. U.C.C. § 3-104(a), (e) (1990).
52 HORWITZ, supra note 46, at 214.
53 Id. at 214-25.
54 Rogers, supra note 43, at 291. Bills and notes were used as a means of ex-
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Therefore, issues relating to an underlying contract, typical of to-
day's consumer credit purchase, rarely arose. 55
2. Recent History
Prior to 1976, home improvement contractors, as well as other
sellers of goods and services to consumers, could separate the
consumer's obligation to pay from the seller's obligation to per-
form. 6 As a result, a homeowner might remain obligated to pay
for home improvements despite breach of contract by the home
improvement contractor, breach of warranty, unconscionability,
or fraud in the transaction. 7 The homeowner's only remedy was
to bring suit against the contractor, which was undesirable be-
cause the contractor might be difficult to locate or judgment
proof.58 In addition, the cost of bringing suit might be
prohibitive.5 9
Contractors and other sellers separated their obligation to per-
form from the consumer's obligation to pay in one of three ways:
(1) by requiring the consumer to execute a negotiable promissory
note and selling the note to a lender having holder in due course
status; (2) by including a waiver of defenses against assignees in
the credit contract; or (3) by arranging for a lender to make a
direct loan to the consumer.60 Under the first scenario, a note-
holder could insist on payment even if home improvements were
defective or never completed because a holder in due course
takes a promissory note free from all personal defenses,61 includ-
ing fraud in the inducement,62 failure of consideration,63 breach
change between merchants and typically represented an obligation to pay funds of
the drawee in the hands of the drawer. Id.
55 Id.
56 Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022-23 (1976) [hereinafter Guidelines].
57 See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
58 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,511-12.
59 Id.
60 Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,023; Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in
Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
503, 506-08 (1975).
61 U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2), (b) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (1966).
62 See FDIC v. Kratz, 898 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1990); Federal Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n v. Gregory, 426 F. Supp. 282, 284-85 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Myers v. Bank of
Prattville, 341 So. 2d 726 (Ala. 1977); Austin v. Atlas Subsidiaries, 223 So. 2d 297,
298 (Miss. 1969); GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAw § 5.31, at 363 (3d ed. 1994); 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-10, at 190 (4th ed. 1995).
63 See Mecham v. United Bank, 489 P.2d 247, 252 (Ariz. 1971); First Nat'l En-
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of warranty,' and unconscionability.65 The second scenario,
placement of a waiver of defenses in the credit contract, essen-
tially gave holder in due course status to an assignee of the con-
tract even if the assignee could not otherwise qualify for such
status. The third scenario, a direct loan by a lender to a home-
owner, was treated as independent of the contract for improve-
ments even if the contractor had arranged the financing.
Defenses arising under the improvement contract thus had no
effect on the homeowner's obligation to repay the loan.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)66 found that sellers fre-
quently used these mechanisms to effectuate unethical sales prac-
tices in consumer transactions.67  Home improvement
contractors in particular often used schemes involving fraud or
deception to induce homeowners to purchase aluminum siding or
other improvements. 68 Because the contractor's obligation to
perform could be separated from the homeowner's obligation to
pay, homeowners lost the right to stop payment when improve-
ments were shoddy or uncompleted.69 Most of these schemes
were directed at the poor; however, middle-class and affluent
homeowners were also victimized, as evidenced by scams relating
to the installation of swimming pools.
70
B. FTC Holder in Due Course Rule
Since 1976, the law has prevented home improvement contrac-
tors from separating the homeowner's duty to pay from the con-
tractor's obligations under the contract. In 1975, the FTC
tertainment Corp. v. Brumlik, 531 So. 2d 403,404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Thomas
v. State Mortgage, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 299 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Holt v. Queen City
Loan & Inv., Inc., 377 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1964); Tipton v. Heeren, 859 P.2d 465, 467
(Nev. 1993); Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1971); NEL-
SON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 5.31, at 364; 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62,
§ 17-10, at 190.
64 See Union Bank v. Seven Seas Imports, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Swafford v. Certified Finance Co., 82 S.E.2d 168, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954); 2
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, § 17-10, at 190.
65 See Gramatan Co. v. D'Amico, 269 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1966); NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 62, § 5.31, at 364; 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, § 17-10, at 190.
66 Congress established the FTC in 1914 as an independent governmental agency
to provide assistance in the implementation of federal antitrust policy. See Federal
Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994)).
67 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,509.
68 Id. at 53,511.
69 See id. at 53,509.
701. at 53,511.
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promulgated a trade regulation rule,7' commonly known as the
Holder in Due Course Rule.72 The FTC intended the Rule to
give consumers the right to assert claims and defenses against
creditors in situations where a seller provides or arranges financ-
ing and then fails to perform his obligations.73 Specifically, the
Rule requires sellers to include in most consumer credit contracts
the following notice:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PUR-
SUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.74
When the Notice is included in a consumer credit contract, an
assignee cannot assert holder in due course status; thus, the con-
sumer may raise claims and defenses relating to the underlying
contract. Furthermore, the Rule prohibits a waiver of defenses
or other language in a consumer credit contract that limits the
application of the notice.75 Finally, the Rule requires a similar
notice if a direct loan is made by a lender affiliated with the seller
"by common control, contract, or business arrangement" or is a
lender to whom the seller refers consumers. 76 The Rule is in-
tended to address all three methods sellers used to sever their
contract obligations from consumers' payment obligations.77
The FTC sought, with this Rule, to shift risks of seller miscon-
71 Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1996);
Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,506.
72 Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,022-23.
73 d. at 20,023.
74 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1996). The Rule makes it "an unfair or deceptive act or
practice" for a seller to "[flake or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to
contain the ... [Notice] in at least ten point, bold face, type." Id. The Rule applies
only to purchases by natural persons who purchase goods or services "for personal,
family, or household use." Id. § 433.1(b).
75 See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,023. If the Notice is included in the con-
tract but additional language limits its application, the requirement that the contract
"contain" the Notice is not met. Id.
76 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1996). The Rule makes it "an unfair or deceptive act or
practice" for a seller to accept loan proceeds unless the required notice is included.
Id. § 433.2. However, the Rule imposes no penalty on the lender for failing to in-
clude the Notice.
77 Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,023.
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duct to creditors who could either absorb the costs of misconduct
or return the costs to sellers.7" Consumers usually are unable to
evaluate the probability of seller misconduct in a given transac-
tion, and they are generally unable to effectively shift costs of
seller misconduct to the culpable party.79 Creditors, on the other
hand, can better evaluate the likelihood of seller misconduct be-
cause they engage in more transactions and have access to more
information." In addition, creditors can better return costs to
culpable sellers because of their contractual arrangements with
sellers and greater access to the legal system. 81 Therefore, the
FTC hoped creditors would prevent misconduct by controlling
practices of sellers and would drive unscrupulous sellers out of
the market by refusing to lend to their customers. 82 The Rule
was intended to minimize costs of seller misconduct and to inter-
nalize costs from remaining seller misconduct so prices of goods,
services, and credit would reflect true transaction costs.
83
In most circumstances, the Rule gives consumers a very power-
ful weapon against unscrupulous sellers-the ability to withhold
payment for the goods or services. Nonpayment forces the seller
or the seller's assignee to sue the consumer for payment; and, if
an assignee does sue, the Notice preserves defenses to payment
based on seller misconduct.
C. Limitations of the Holder in Due Course Rule
While the FTC's Holder in Due Course Rule was designed to
give consumers the ability to withhold payment where a seller
fails to perform in a satisfactory manner,' its effectiveness is lim-
ited. First, consumer rights provided by the Notice depend on
seller compliance with the Rule. If the seller fails to include the
Notice in a consumer credit contract, an assignee who purchases
the contract in good faith and without notice of a claim or de-
78 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,523; William F. Green-
halgh, Comment, The FTC's Holder-In-Due-Course Rule: An Ineffective Means of
Achieving Optimality in the Consumer Credit Market, 25 UCLA L. REV. 821, 827
(1978).
79 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,522-23.
80 Id. at 53,523.
81 Id.
82 Id.; Greenhalgh, supra note 78, at 827, 834.
83 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,523. But see Greenhalgh,
supra note 78, at 859-60 (arguing that the Rule does not achieve optimality).
84 See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,022; Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra
note 7, at 53,509.
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fense is a holder in due course with protection against claims and
defenses by the consumer.85 Similarly, if the seller violates the
Rule by including a waiver of defenses in the consumer credit
contract, the consumer will not be able to assert defenses to pay-
ment against an assignee of the contract.86 Finally, the Rule
places the burden on the seller, not the lender, to insure that loan
documents between a lender and a consumer contain the
Notice.87
Another weakness of the Rule is its limitation on recovery by
the consumer. The Notice provides that "[r]ecovery hereunder
by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor here-
under. '' 88 As a result, when a consumer seeks affirmative relief
from the lender,89 the consumer may only recover the amounts
paid under the consumer credit contract.9" The lender is not lia-
ble for additional damages caused by seller misconduct. 91
85 See Greenhalgh, supra note 78, at 853-54. The FTC recognized this limitation
and proposed an amendment to the Rule that would have extended its applicability
to lenders as well as sellers. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (1975). The amendment was not
ultimately promulgated.
86 See Blackmon v. Hindrew, 824 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. App. 1992). In Blackmon, a
contractor agreed to do certain home improvements for $8,800 to be paid with inter-
est over a term of five years. The contract contained the Notice but also included
the following language: "Buyer agrees not to assert against the assignee of the
holder of the note any claim Buyer may have against the Seller." Id. at 86 (empha-
sis omitted). Upon completion of the improvements, the homeowner signed a certif-
icate of completion, a promissory note, and a deed of trust, and the contractor
assigned the note the same day. When the homeowner later discovered that the
improvements were defective, she sued the assignee of the note and the trustees for
the contractor. Id.
The court in Blackmon held that the assignee was not liable to the homeowner
because the qualifying language of the contract abrogated any protection given by
the Notice. Id. at 88-89. The homeowner was left dependant on state law for poten-
tial relief. Id.
87 See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1996).
88 Id.
89 A consumer may want to sue the lender if some portion of the debt has been
paid or if seller misconduct has caused damages beyond the amount of the debt.
See, e.g., Perez v. Briercraft Serv. Corp., 809 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1991) (homeowner
sued lender after siding fell off, windows fell apart, and improperly installed sewer
vents caused foul odors in the house). Before promulgation of the Rule, the con-
sumer had to sue the seller because the lender, as a holder in due course, was pro-
tected against defenses and claims. The consumer can now recover from the lender,
but only to the extent of amounts paid.
90 See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,023. In those cases in which the amount
paid under the contract is small, the cost of bringing suit may exceed potential
recovery.
91 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Morgan, 536 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. 1989); Briercroft,
809 S.W.2d at 217 (Tex. 1991); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 134-35
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In this Article, I focus primarily on two additional limitations
on effectiveness of the Holder in Due Course Rule. First, the
Rule leaves the burden of proving defenses to payment on the
consumer. Although the Rule abrogates the protection against
claims and defenses ordinarily afforded the holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument, it does not affect other aspects of ne-
gotiability.92 In a suit on a promissory note, the maker of the
note has the burden to prove any defenses to payment. 93 There-
fore, a homeowner who executes a promissory note to evidence
an obligation to pay for home improvements bears the burden to
prove defects in the contractor's performance as a defense to
payment.
Second, the Rule does not always preserve the consumer's
most effective weapon-the ability to withhold payment if a
seller has not adequately performed. Withholding payment is
useless if a lender can foreclose on property securing a debt for
goods or services without a judicial hearing.94 This scenario
(Tex. 1987). Consumers have recovered additional damages from lenders by show-
ing that the lender was involved in the fraud or that the contractor was acting as the
lender's agent. See Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 301 (1992); Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627
S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982); Gene A. Marsh, Lender Liability for Consumer Fraud
Practices of Retail Dealers and Home Improvement Contractors, 45 ALA. L. REV. 1
(1993).
92 See Rev. U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (1990). Under the prior version of Article 3,
Professors White and Summers concluded that the effect of the Notice was to defeat
negotiability of a promissory note by making the buyer's promise to pay conditional
and therefore preventing an owner of the note from having holder in due course
status. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 14-8, at 638-39 (3d ed. 1988). Professor Sturley criticized this view as being incon-
sistent with the intent of the FTC. See Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the
Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Notice on a Negotiable Instru-
ment. How Clever Are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 953 (1990). Article
3, as revised, resolves this issue with the following section:
If a promise or order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession
of a holder contains a statement, required by applicable statutory or ad-
ministrative law, to the effect that the rights of a holder or transferee are
subject to claims or defenses that the issuer could assert against the original
payee, the promise or order is not thereby made conditional for the pur-
poses of Section 3-104(a); but if the promise or order is an instrument,
there cannot be a holder in due course of the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (1990). Therefore, in those states that have adopted the revised
Article 3 the effect of the Notice is to preclude holder in due course status without
precluding negotiability. See U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 3 (1990); Fred H. Miller, The Ben-
efits of New UCC Articles 3 and 4, 24 UCC L.J. 99, 105 (1991).
93 See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
94 The problem raised by non-judicial foreclosure is not limited to cases where a
seller has assigned its right to payment under a consumer credit contract since the
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arises with automobile loans, since automobiles can be repos-
sessed by self-help under Article 9 of the UCC,95 and with home
improvement loans, since many states permit power of sale fore-
closure of real property.96 Although a homeowner may have a
valid defense to payment and thus to foreclosure, the home-
owner must bring suit to obtain an injunction against a power of
sale foreclosure.
D. Other Federal Consumer Protection Measures
A number of other federal measures protect homeowners in
home improvement loan transactions. 97 Some federal measures
are directed in particular at home improvement scams. For ex-
ample, the Truth in Lending Act gives a homeowner the right to
rescind a non-purchase money home mortgage loan for three
days following the later of the closing of the loan or the delivery
of the rescission notice and other disclosures required under the
Act.98 Most home improvement loans are secured by a lien on
the homeowner's home and are therefore subject to the three
day cancellation right. The purpose of the cancellation right is to
permit homeowners to reevaluate a transaction that creates a lien
on their home. 9 Lenders are not permitted to disburse loan pro-
ceeds, and contractors are not permitted to begin performance,
prior to the expiration of the rescission period.'" If the home-
owner exercises the rescission right, the homeowner is not liable
seller can foreclose a consensual lien without a hearing based on a homeowner's
failure to pay for improvements in those states that permit non-judicial foreclosure.
95 U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990). Other consumer goods are likely to be located in the
debtor's house and thus could not be repossessed without a breach of the peace. Id.
96 See infra note 166.
97 See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2617 (1994) (requiring home mortgage lenders to give borrowers a "good faith esti-
mate" of closing costs and prohibiting kickbacks and referral fees for referral of
business related to settlement services in residential mortgage loans); Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994) (requiring disclosures, including amount
financed, finance charge expressed as an "annual percentage rate," and total of pay-
ments, and providing other protection to consumers in credit transactions); Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, id. § 1692-1692o (prohibiting certain abusive and de-
ceptive collection practices); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, id. §§ 2301-12 (imposing certain requirements upon written
express warranties in consumer transactions); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1995)
(interpreting and expanding upon the Truth in Lending Act).
98 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (e).
99 Kathleen Keest, Spiking and Loan-Splitting in Home Improvement Financing:
Artful Dodges, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 415, 416 (1992).100 See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(c).
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for any amounts that would otherwise be due, and the lender
must refund any amounts already paid.10 1 If the lender fails to
comply with requirements of the Act, the right of cancellation is
extended for as long as three years.102 This right of rescission
does not, however, protect the homeowner who is given the re-
quired disclosures but discovers after the rescission period that
home improvements are incomplete or substandard.
10 3
Congress recently amended the Truth in Lending Act to re-
quire additional disclosures and to prohibit certain unfair terms
in home improvement and home equity loans with particularly
high interest rates or points.1' One of the newly prohibited
practices is the payment of advances under a home improvement
loan directly to the contractor. 05 A lender is permitted to make
advances payable jointly to the contractor and homeowner. 106
While this prohibition will prevent some abuses, it applies only to
loans with particularly high interest rates.
While many federal measures protect home improvement bor-
rowers, none specifically addresses limitations on the effective-
ness of the Holder in Due Course Rule.'07 Federal law leaves the
101 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).
1
02 Id. § 1635(f).
103 Some lenders and contractors have attempted to circumvent the three-day re-
scission period. Keest, supra note 99, at 417. A contractor may begin performance
of the home improvements prior to the expiration of the cancellation period despite
the prohibition of this practice. Id. The contractor may then tell the homeowner
that the right of cancellation is not available because work has begun or that the
homeowner must pay for the work already performed. Id. Another scheme in-
volves separation of the contract for the home improvements from the loan. Id. at
418. The homeowner is not told the full cost of the improvements and financing
until after the right of rescission for the home improvement contract has expired.
The homeowner may want to cancel the loan, but the contractor must still be paid.
Id. at 419. Courts have found in some cases that these schemes violated the delay of
performance requirement and have therefore permitted a homeowner to rescind af-
ter the expiration of the three-day period. See Doggett v. County Sav. & Loan Co.,
373 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). The schemes are effective, however, where
homeowners never learn of their rights under the Act or where they fail to take
affirmative action to enforce their rights.
104 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit.
1.B, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1648 (1994)). The loans
affected are those with an annual percentage rate more than ten percentage points
greater than the rate on a Treasury security of comparable maturity or with points
and fees exceeding the greater of eight percent of the loan amount or $400. Id.
§ 152(a), 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)).
105 Id. § 152(d), 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(i)).
107 Sd.
107 See supra part II.C.
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burdens of proof and initiating a lawsuit on a homeowner who is
the victim of a home improvement scam.
E. State Law
Some states give consumers additional protection against un-
scrupulous sellers. State law may sometimes fill gaps left by the
Holder in Due Course Rule. First, courts in most states apply the
"close-connectedness" doctrine-a judicially created doctrine
pre-dating the Holder in Due Course Rule-to abrogate the
holder in due course doctrine where the assignor and assignee of
a note have a close relationship. 108 Under the close-connected-
ness doctrine, the relationship between an assignor and assignee
may be used to impute notice of defenses or lack of good faith."°
The doctrine applies even in those situations where the seller
fails to include the FTC Notice in a note.110 However, the doc-
trine does not apply where a lender with a relationship to the
seller makes a direct loan to a consumer."' The close-connect-
edness doctrine also does not affect allocation of the burdens of
proof or initiating suit.
Second, a number of states have adopted either the 1968 or the
1974 version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UC3)," 2
which may place the burden to prove a contractor's performance
of home improvements on the lender. The UC3 provides that a
seller may not accept a negotiable instrument other than a check
as evidence of a consumer's obligation. 1 3 This section is in-
tended to prevent assignees of consumer credit contracts from
obtaining holder in due course status by prohibiting the use of
negotiable instruments in certain consumer credit transactions.'
4
To the extent this section causes sellers to evidence a consumer's
obligation to pay in such a way that the obligation is conditioned
108 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 5.29, at 352.
10 9 Id.
110 The doctrine was first recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), before the FITC promulgated the
Holder in Due Course Rule.
111 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 5.29, at 352.
112 Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have
adopted the 1968 Act. See 7 U.L.A. 475 (1997). Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Maine
have adopted the 1974 Act. See 7A U.L.A. 1 (1996 Supp.). Colorado has adopted a
hybrid of the two. Id.
113 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.307 (1974) [hereinafter U.C.C.C.];
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403 (1968).
114 See U.C.C.C. § 3.307 cmt. (1974); U.C.C.C. § 2.403 cmt. (1968).
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on seller's performance, it also prevents shifting the burden of
proof to the consumer." 5 In addition, the 1974 version of the
UC3 prevents holder in due course status, regardless of seller
compliance, by making an assignee subject to all claims and de-
fenses the consumer could have raised against the seller. 1 6 Even
under the 1974 version, however, a homeowner must file suit to
raise defenses if the lender can foreclose without judicial process.
Finally, some states prohibit foreclosure without a hearing,
placing the burden of initiating suit on a home improvement




Although the Holder in Due Course Rule preserves a home-
owner's defenses against a home improvement lender when the
lender has a relationship to the contractor, current law leaves the
burden to prove any defense to foreclosure 1 7 and, in many
115 The section does not prohibit sellers from taking a promissory note which is
not negotiable only because it is not payable to order or bearer. Under the prior
version of the UCC, such an instrument is treated in the same manner as a negotia-
ble instrument except that there can be no holder in due course thereof. U.C.C. § 3-
805 (1966). There is no comparable provision in revised Article 3 except with re-
spect to checks. See U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1990). Therefore, a promise not payable
to order could not be a negotiable instrument, although some of the characteristics
of negotiability could arise under ordinary principles of contract law. Id.
116 U.C.C.C. § 3.404(1) (1974). Under the 1968 version of the UC3 , the seller's
violation of the prohibition against taking a negotiable instrument affects an as-
signee lender only if the lender had notice that the instrument was issued in viola-
tion of the provision. U.C.C.C. § 2.403 (1968). Another limitation of the 1968
version of the UC 3 is that it applies to consumer credit contracts originated by the
seller and transferred to a lender, but does not apply where a seller arranges financ-
ing to be made directly by a lender. The 1974 version makes direct lenders subject
to claims and defenses where a sufficient relationship between the seller and the
lender exists. U.C.C.C. § 3.405(1) (1974). See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying
text.
117 The burden of proof is in fact two separate burdens: (1) the burden of produc-
ing evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element in the first instance;
and (2) the burden of persuasion to establish that, more likely than not, the element
exists in view of all the evidence. See Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading:
An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1959). Because the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion generally go hand in
hand, id. at 16, the term "burden of proof" is sufficiently descriptive of both burdens
for purposes of this Article. But see Alex Stein, Allocating the Burden of Proof in
Sales Litigation: The Law, Its Rationale, a New Theory, and Its Failure, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 335 (1996) (emphasizing the difference in the application of allocation
rules).
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states, the burden to initiate a lawsuit on the homeowner. The
burden of proof falls on the homeowner when her obligation to
pay for home improvements is evidenced by a promissory note.
The burden of initiating suit falls on the homeowner when a
home improvement lender is permitted to foreclose by power of
sale. Placing these burdens on the homeowner is inappropriate
in circumstances in which defenses to payment are likely, such as
when the contractor and lender have a relationship.
A. Burden of Proof Construction Contract vs.
Promissory Note
Allocation of the burden of proof in a suit to collect payment
for home improvements depends upon whether the homeowner's
obligation to pay is evidenced by a promissory note. When a
homeowner pays cash for home improvements, her obligation to
pay is created by the construction contract between the contrac-
tor and the homeowner. Under the terms of the contract, the
contractor promises to perform certain work and the homeowner
promises to pay for these improvements. In the absence of a
contract provision to the contrary, performance of services is re-
quired before payment for the services becomes due.' 18 With mi-
nor improvements, the contractor usually performs before the
homeowner pays. With more complex improvements, the con-
tract will typically provide for progress payments as work pro-
Another burden in litigation is the burden of pleading. A plaintiff must plead all
of the essential elements of the cause of action, and a defendant must plead any
defenses that are to be raised. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 5.15, at 275-76 (2d ed. 1993); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11
at 156-57 (4th ed. 1992). As a general rule, the burden of pleading falls on the same
party as the burden of proof. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra § 5.15, at 276; JAMES ET
AL., supra § 7.16, at 344. In a few instances, the burdens do not fall on the same
party. For example, in many jurisdictions a plaintiff must plead nonpayment in a suit
on a note, but the defendant must raise payment as an affirmative defense.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, § 5.15, at 276; JAMES ET AL., supra, § 7.16, at 344. The
defenses discussed in this Article are not among the few instances in which place-
ment of these burdens differ. In addition, the burden of proof is a more significant
burden than the burden of pleading. As Professor Cleary says, "requiring a party to
allege a particular element in his pleading is not a burden having an independent
existence in and for itself, but merely the expression of decisions reached as to the
incidence of responsibioity for elements." Cleary, supra, at 15. Therefore, in this
Article, I refer only to the burden of proof except where a discussion of the burden
of pleading is necessary.
118 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.11, at 611-15 (2d ed. 1990); Jus-
TIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS § 22.01, at 460 (5th ed. 1994).
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gresses. 119 In the event the contractor fails to perform his
obligations under the contract, the homeowner may simply re-
fuse to pay the contract price. If the contractor brings suit
against the homeowner, the contractor must prove the terms of
the underlying transaction and that a breach occurred. 1 20 Specif-
ically, the contractor must establish substantial performance, 12'
and he will not prevail if he has not substantially performed. The
homeowner must prove any relevant affirmative defenses, such
as fraud or unconscionability.
122
The contractor may have a contractual lien or a mechanic's
lien securing the homeowner's obligation to pay for home im-
provements. Most states require judicial foreclosure of a
mechanic's lien 123 and some states require judicial foreclosure of
a contractual lien.124 In a judicial foreclosure action, the contrac-
tor must prove the existence of a debt by establishing
performance.
25
If home improvements are being financed and state law per-
mits, the homeowner typically will be required to execute a
promissory note containing an unconditional promise to pay the
amount of the contract price. The promissory note may be paya-
ble to a third party lender if funds are being advanced by the
lender, or may be payable to the contractor if the contractor in-
tends to transfer the note to the lender.126 The promissory note
is usually secured by a deed of trust or mortgage on the home-
owner's home. If the contractor fails to perform, the homeowner
may stop making payments on the note. However, if the home-
owner refuses to pay, the noteholder may accelerate and sue on
the note or begin foreclosure proceedings. The note, although
related to the underlying obligation on the construction contract,
119 See SWEET, supra note 118, § 22.02, at 461.
120 See Cleary, supra note 117, at 7 (discussing the prima facie case and defense);
James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law
of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929, 940 (1987); Barry L. Za-
retsky, Contract Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments, 42 ALA. L. REV. 627,
633 (1991).
121 See SWEET, supra note 118, § 22.06, at 476-83.
122 See Cleary, supra note 117, at 7; Zaretsky, supra note 120, at 633.
123 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 12.4, at 905.
124 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
125 For example, in Texas a petition for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien should
recite that the contractor supplied labor or materials. 18 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III
& LARRY KNIPPA, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 271.100[1] (1996).
126 Typically, contractors do not finance the improvements themselves but rely on
a third party lender that is involved initially or when the contractor assigns the note.
[Vol. 75, 19961
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing
provides a separate basis for enforcement of the payment
obligation.'27
Article 3 of the UCC provides for allocation of the burden of
proof in a suit on a negotiable instrument. 128 Under Article 3, a
noteholder is entitled to recover simply by producing the instru-
ment, unless the defendant establishes a defense to payment.
29
The maker of a promissory note has the burden to prove any
defenses to payment, such as failure of consideration, breach of
warranty, unconscionability, or fraud.1 30 Therefore, while a con-
tractor must prove substantial performance in a suit brought on a
contract for home improvements, the homeowner must prove de-
ficiencies in performance as a defense to a suit on a note. 13 1 The
execution of a promissory note to evidence the homeowner's ob-
ligation to pay for home improvements thus shifts the burden of
proof on issues related to performance. Where a relationship be-
tween the home improvement contractor and the lender exists,
placement of this burden on the homeowner does not comport
with traditional notions of appropriate allocation of the burden
of proof.
B. Allocation Rules
Certain factors are typically considered in allocating the bur-
den of proof.132 These factors include the parties' relative access
to evidence, probability of the outcome, and policy. 1 33 Access to
evidence is a factor in the allocation of the burden because the
party with superior knowledge of, or control over, evidence rele-
127 See Zaretsky, supra note 120, at 632.
128 U.C.C. § 3-308 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-307 (1966).
129 U.C.C. § 3-308(b) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-307(2) (1966). The validity of signatures
is deemed admitted unless they are specifically denied. U.C.C. § 3-308(a) (1990);
U.C.C. § 3-307(1) (1966).
130 After a defense is established, a holder may seek to cut off the defense by
establishing that he is a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-308(b) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-
307(3) (1966).
131 See Rogers, supra note 120, at 941-42; Zaretsky, supra note 120, at 633. Even
if a promissory note is not a negotiable instrument governed by Article 3, the maker
has the burden to plead and prove defenses based on the underlying contract be-
cause the execution of a note turns a conditional obligation into an unconditional
one.
132 JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 7.16, at 344-45. The same factors are usually
considered in allocating the burden of pleading. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note
117, § 5.15, at 276; JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 3.11, at 159-61.
133 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 3.11, at 159-60; Cleary, supra note 117, at
11-13; Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 60-61 (1961) [here-
inafter James, Burdens of Proof].
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vant to an issue should be required to prove that issue.1 34
Probability is a factor because the burden should usually be
placed on the party attempting to show that the case departs
from the normal course of events.135 Probability thus allows
close cases to be decided correctly more often than not.136 Fi-
nally, policy is a factor because the party with the burden of
proof is handicapped to some extent. 137 Policy can provide the
basis for determining which party should bear the handicap and
lose a close case.
In an action against the maker of a promissory note, Article 3
places the burden to prove defenses to payment on the maker.138
This placement of burden can be evaluated in light of the above
allocation factors. First, evaluation will be based on an assump-
tion that the promissory note evidences the maker's obligation to
pay a loan unrelated to any underlying contract for the purchase
of goods or services. 13 9 Defenses that could arise in connection
with this type of loan include lack of consideration (if loan funds
were never advanced), prior payment of the note, and usury. Be-
cause the payee and maker should have equal access to evidence
regarding such defenses, the burden of proof could be placed on
134 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 3.11, at 160, § 7.16, at 344; Cleary, supra
note 117, at 12; James, Burdens of Proof, supra note 133, at 60. Professor Cleary
calls this factor "fairness." Cleary, supra note 117, at 12. Professor Stein writes that
access to evidence should be a factor in allocating the burden of producing evidence
but not in allocating the burdens of persuasion. Stein, supra note 118, at 335.
135 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 3.11, at 160; Cleary, supra note 117, at 12-
13; James, Burdens of Proof, supra note 133, at 60-61; Lawrence B. Solum, You
Prove It! Why Should 1?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 691, 701 (1994). Professor
Solum describes this function of the burden of proof as follows:
[I]n a legal case, allocation of the burden may simply be a method or proce-
dure for producing the best outcomes in the long run, or (in the language of
decision theory) maximizing the expected utility of legal proceedings. Usu-
ally, this will be the most accurate outcome, but not always. For example,
the burden of persuasion in a criminal case may be proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, because the disutility of convicting an innocent person far ex-
ceeds the disutility of finding a guilty person to be not guilty: better that
ten guilty persons go free than one innocent person be convicted.
Id. at 701.
136 The difficulty with the probability factor is in determining the relevant group
on which to base the calculation of probability. See Cleary, supra note 117, at 13.
137 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 117, § 3.11, at 160, § 7.16, at 345; Cleary, supra
note 117, at 11-12; James, Burdens of Proof, supra note 133, at 61.
138 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
139 Examples include commercial loans, home purchase money loans, and con-
sumer loans made for the purchase of goods or services by lenders with no relation-
ship to the seller. See infra part IV.D. for a discussion of these types of loans.
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either party if the note were not intended to be transferred.
However, where a promissory note has been transferred to a
third party, the maker of the note has superior knowledge of and
control over evidence regarding defenses. Placing the burden of
proof on the maker rather than on the transferee is therefore
appropriate.
With regard to probability, defenses to payment tend to arise
only in the unusual case. Typically, when a maker executes a
promissory note, funds are advanced, and when a lender sues on
a note, the note has not been paid. 14 Thus, placement of the
burden on the maker to prove the unusual case-that the maker
never received loan funds or paid the note-is appropriate.
Finally, the strong policy of transferability of negotiable instru-
ments arguably justifies placing the burden of proof on the
maker of a note. A promissory note is more readily transferred
if the transferee will not later be required to prove matters about
which the original parties have superior knowledge. Therefore,
the burden may appropriately be placed on the maker of a prom-
issory note evidencing a loan unrelated to purchase of goods or
services.
This allocation analysis changes with respect to a note evidenc-
ing the obligation of a homeowner to pay for home improve-
ments performed by a contractor with a relationship to the
lender. In this case, the homeowner can raise defenses based on
the contractor's performance. As between the contractor and
the homeowner, the contractor has superior knowledge of, and
control over, evidence of substantial completion. As between
the lender and the homeowner, the parties should have roughly
equal access to evidence of performance because the lender
should have obtained this evidence from the contractor prior to
advancing funds. This factor therefore does not mandate placing
the burden of proof on the homeowner.
Probability requires shifting the burden of proof to the lender
only if valid defenses are more likely than not in the relevant set
of transactions. The first step in applying the probability factor is
to determine this relevant test group.'41 While most home im-
provements are completed to the satisfaction of the homeowner,
unsatisfactory completion occurs regularly in an identifiable set
of transactions-those where the contractor and the lender have
140 See infra part IV.D.
141 See supra note 136.
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a relationship-because related lenders are less likely to police
contractors by withholding loan funds until improvements are
satisfactorily completed.' 42 Therefore, the test group should in-
clude only those cases in which the home improvement lender
has a relationship to the contractor. In addition, the test group
should include only those cases in which the lender is suing or
foreclosing because of non-payment on the note.' 43 The home-
owner may simply be unable to pay for the improvements, or she
may be refusing to pay because of the contractor's failure to sat-
isfactorily complete them. 44 Although there is no empirical
data, contractors fail to satisfactorily complete improvements in a
significant number of transactions where there is a relationship
between the contractor and the lender. 145 In fact, in cases of
home improvement loans made to poor or elderly homeown-
ers-cases in which the lender and contractor tend to have a rela-
tionship-a fraudulent or abusive transaction may be the norm
rather than the exception, and contractors in such transactions
are unlikely to complete improvements in a satisfactory manner.
Therefore, probability arguably weighs in favor of placing the
burden of proof on the lender.
Policy most clearly requires placing the burden of proof on the
lender. Policy favoring promissory notes' transferability should
yield in the consumer credit context to policy that favors protect-
ing a consumer's home. 146 Negotiability of home improvement
notes and other consumer paper is not necessary to foster the
flow of commerce. 147 Consumer paper is rarely transferred in a
long series of assignments to a party without any relationship to
or knowledge of the original payee.' 41 On the other hand, when
a homeowner is handicapped in defending a suit on a home im-
142 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
143 Cases in which a homeowner has paid for satisfactory improvements are not
relevant. As Professor Cleary says: "The litigated cases would seem to furnish the
more appropriate basis for estimating probabilities." Cleary, supra note 117 at 13.
144 The Hogans made payments despite the contractor's shoddy performance until
James Hogan had to stop working because of a job-related injury. House Consumer
Credit Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 55-56 (statement of James R. Hogan,
Sr.).
145 See supra Part I.A.
146 See Forrester, supra note 17, at 406-09.
147 Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 401. The FTC found that "[tihe considerations
which underpin the laws of negotiability have little or no application in consumer
transactions where the integrity of the commercial paper market is not a concern."
Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,507.
148 Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 378-79.
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provement note, the stakes are high. The homeowner may pay
for improvements that were not performed or, worse, may lose
the home.' 49 The interest in avoiding such an outcome clearly
outweighs the need for negotiability of the homeowner's note.
Therefore, policy requires placing burden of proof in a suit for
payment of a home improvement note on the lender if that
lender has a relationship with the contractor.
The transformation of a homeowner's conditional obligation to
pay for home improvements under a construction contract into
an unconditional obligation to pay evidenced by a promissory
note is simply inappropriate where the home improvement
lender has purchased the obligation from the contractor or other-
wise has a relationship to the contractor. The FTC determined
that the holder in due course doctrine should not apply to con-
sumer credit transactions, including home improvement loans. 150
Similarly, the presumption of consideration created by a promis-
sory note should not apply. Therefore, the law should not permit
a lender to require that a homeowner's obligation to pay for
home improvements be evidenced by a promissory note unless
the lender is truly independent of the contractor.
IV
BURDEN OF INITIATING SUIT
The burden of initiating suit is a more significant burden to the
victim of a home improvement scam than the burden of proof. 5'
As a general rule, allocation of the burden of initiating suit is
determined by the circumstances giving rise to a claim. 152 In any
dispute involving property, the party without physical possession
of the disputed assets has the burden of initiating suit. 53 In some
cases, the law shifts the burden of initiating suit.'
54
The FTC's Holder in Due Course Rule was intended to give
149 See supra part I.C.
150 See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,507, 53,511.
151 See infra part IV.C.2.
152 For example, in tort litigation, the injured party has the burden to sue. Under
contract law, the burden to sue usually falls on the party claiming breach of contract
unless that party can shift the burden by not performing.
153 Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Con-
sumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 116 (1987).
154 For example, the law places the burden of initiating suit to recover disputed
credit card amounts on financial institutions. Id. at 117 n.199. The cardholder may
refuse to pay disputed amounts, and the financial institution is not permitted to set
off the amount against other deposits of the cardholder. 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (1994).
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consumers the power, based on a valid defense, to withhold pay-
ment for goods and services purchased on credit.15 5 In connec-
tion with purchases of most types of goods or services, the Rule
shifts the burden of initiating suit away from the consumer. Prior
to the Rule's promulgation, a consumer could not raise valid de-
fenses against the noteholder. As a result, a consumer was re-
quired to pay the noteholder and her only recourse to recover
the sums paid was to bring suit against the seller.'56 Since pro-
mulgation of the Rule, consumers have been able to raise valid
defenses against noteholders. 157 A consumer with a valid de-
fense may withhold payment from the noteholder, thereby re-
taining the disputed assets and making a suit against the seller
unnecessary. The Rule permits the consumer to withhold pay-
ment and removes the burden of initiating suit in cases where a
lender may not repossess collateral without judicial action.
In states that permit power of sale foreclosure, the holder of a
note secured by real estate may foreclose and apply sale pro-
ceeds from the debtor's property against the debt without a judi-
cial hearing. Thus, if a homeowner withholds payment on a
home improvement loan, the lender can satisfy the debt by fore-
closing on her home. To assert a valid defense to payment of the
note, the homeowner either must continue to make payments
and seek a declaratory judgment voiding the debt or must enjoin
the foreclosure. 15 8 A homeowner's only mechanism to prevent
foreclosure is through the courts. Power of sale foreclosure
therefore shifts the burden of initiating suit to the homeowner.
A. Judicial Foreclosure
Approximately twenty states prohibit power of sale foreclo-
155 See Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,022.
156 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 7, at 53,511-12.
157 See supra part II.B. An optimistic view of the world would assume that note
holders who know of a consumer's valid defense to payment are unlikely to sue the
consumer. It is only where a note holder is not aware of a defense or is not certain
of its validity that the note holder is likely to actually initiate a losing lawsuit against
the consumer. However, unscrupulous lenders may count on the consumer's igno-
rance of defenses or on the consumer's unwillingness to appear in court to assert
them. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
158 The homeowner could also file bankruptcy to stay the foreclosure and raise
the defense in the bankruptcy proceeding to prevent allowance of the lender's claim.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1994). Except as a vehicle to assert a defense or as a
delay tactic, bankruptcy provides little protection to homeowners facing foreclosure.
See Forrester, supra note 17, at 427-30.
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sure, 159 making judicial action the only means available to fore-
close a mortgage lien. Judicial foreclosure requirements vary
from state to state, but generally include the following steps: a
title search to determine ownership interests in the land, filing a
foreclosure bill of complaint, service of process, hearing, entry of
the court's judgment, notice of sale, sale, judicial confirmation of
the sale, distribution of sale proceeds, and determination of any
deficiency judgment. 160 The court oversees each of these steps,
providing some safeguard against defects in the sale process.
The lender initiates the foreclosure action by filing a complaint
that must comply with pleading requirements. 16 1 In Texas, for
example, the complaint must allege the existence of the indebt-
edness, default by the debtor, and the existence of a lien. 162 The
foreclosing lender must name as defendants all parties with an
interest in the property that will be affected adversely by foreclo-
sure and must provide adequate notice to these parties. 63 In
many cases, the borrower does not file an answer, probably be-
cause the borrower has no defense to payment. When the bor-
rower does have a viable defense, there is usually a trial on the
issues.16" If the borrower fails to answer or has no valid defense,
the court will enter judgment for the lender and order a sale.
After sale at public auction, most states provide for judicial con-
firmation to insure that the foreclosing lender complied with all
statutory requirements for foreclosure.
165
B. Power of Sale Foreclosure
Most states permit a mortgage lender to foreclose by power of
sale.166 Power of sale foreclosure has been criticized because no-
tice requirements are frequently insufficient, 167 because there is
1 59 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 7.11, at 490.
160 See 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE §§ 12.05-
.14 (1995); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 7.11, at 491-92.
161 DUNAWAY, supra note 160, § 12.05.
162 17 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III & LARRY KNIPPA, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE
§ 255.04(2) (1996).
163 DUNAWAY, supra note 160, § 11.03(9)(g).
164 Id. § 12.06(1).
165 Id. § 12.13(7).
166 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 7.19, at 512. More than 30 jurisdic-
tions permit power of sale foreclosure. Id. § 7.19 n.I.
167 See David A. Leen et al., Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange Bedfel-
lows?, 48 WASH. L. REV. 763, 793-94, 800 (1973); David M. Madway, A Mortgage
Foreclosure Primer, Part H, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 250, 258, 265 (1974); David P.
Cotellesse, Note, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust: Some Problems of
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no opportunity for a hearing prior to foreclosure, 168 and because
the foreclosure sale price is often below fair market value. 169 Af-
ter the United States Supreme Court held certain prejudgment
remedies unconstitutional as violating debtors' procedural due
process rights, 7 ° commentators speculated about the constitu-
tionality of power of sale foreclosure. 17 ' Most state power of sale
foreclosure schemes pass constitutional muster, not because of
the adequacy of their notice and hearing requirements, but be-
cause of the absence of state action. 172 However, constitutional-
Notice, 49 TEX. L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (1971); Paul J. Delcambre, Jr., Comment, Due
Process Problems of Mississippi Power of Sale Foreclosure, 47 Miss. L.J. 67, 89
(1976); Wesley D. Turner, Note, Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 871, 872, 891 (1978).
168 See Leen et al., supra note 167, at 793-94, 797; Madway, supra note 167, at 258,
268; Delcambre, supra note 167, at 88-89; "lbmer, supra note 167, at 872.
169 See Lawrence Berger, Solving the Problem of Abusive Mortgage Foreclosure
Sales, 66 NEB. L. REV. 373, 373 (1987); David J. Dietrich, The Montana Judicial and
Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale: Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 49 Morrr. L.
REV. 285, 327-28 (1988); Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Process-A Proposal to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State
Law with the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of the Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J.
1061 (1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic
Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959
(1993); Grant S. Nelson, The Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy on the Real Estate
Mortgagee: Current Problems and Some Suggested Solutions, 50 Mo. L. REV. 217,
248 (1985); Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price
Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843 (1980); Steven
Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Fore-
closure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1985).
170 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding procedure for prejudgment re-
plevin to be unconstitutional); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (holding procedure for the prejudgment garnishment of wages to be
unconstitutional).
171 See Leen et al., supra note 167; Madway, supra note 167, at 258-69; Grant S.
Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure: A Judi-
cial Dilemma, 43 Mo. L. REV. 25 (1978); Grant S. Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure
Under Power of Sale-Constitutional Problems-Legislative Alternatives, 28 J. Mo.
B. 428 (1972); Delcambre, supra note 167; Donald L. Schwartz, Comment, Power of
Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 206 (1972); Nancy Sullivan, Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of the California Trustee's Sale, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1282
(1973); Turner, supra note 167, at 888-91; Charles R. Wilson, Comment, Validity of
Power of Sale and Procedural Considerations in Its Exercise, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 611
(1968).
172 See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v.
Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Federal Nat'l Mort-
gage Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.) (en Banc), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
909 (1975). But see Tbrner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (hold-
ing unconstitutional the North Carolina power of sale statute which required exten-
[Vol. 75, 1996]
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing
ity does not ensure fairness nor does it establish that public
policy should permit such schemes.
Foreclosure notice requirements vary from state to state in
terms of notice periods, types of notice, and parties to be noti-
fied.'73 Procedural due process, where applicable, requires that
notice must be "reasonably calculated ... to apprise interested
parties."' 74 While most power of sale foreclosure statutes now
require notice by mail or personal service rather than merely by
publication,17 statutes may not require that notice be given to all
parties with an interest in the property.176 Nevertheless, because
adequacy of notice is not an inherent problem with power of sale
foreclosure, I do not address it further.
Inadequacy of bid price has received a substantial amount of
attention in recent years.177 A forced sale at foreclosure simply
does not produce a price equal to fair market value. As a result,
homeowners who lose their homes to foreclosure may lose their
equity in the home,178 or may face a deficiency judgment if fore-
closure proceeds fail to satisfy the debt. 179 In some states, lend-
sive involvement of the court clerk in power of sale foreclosure). Of course, where
the mortgagee is a state or the federal government, a power of sale foreclosure is
state or federal action.
173 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 7.19, at 534.
174 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See
also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (holding that no-
tice of a tax sale to a mortgagee by publication and posting did not satisfy notice
requirements of the 14th Amendment).
175 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 7.19, at 534. A few states still re-
quire notice by publication only. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-162, 162.2,
162.3 (Harrison 1994) (applicable to nonresidential mortgages only); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 89-1-55 (1991).
176 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-715 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.03 (West
1988); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).
177 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 169; Dietrich, supra note 169, at 316-28; Gover &
West, supra note 169; Johnson, supra note 169; Nelson, supra note 169, at 248;
Washburn, supra note 169; Wechsler, supra note 169.
178 See Johnson, supra note 169, at 966-67. Professor Johnson's hypothetical bor-
rower, Karen Mortgagor, has $60,000 of equity in her home, but she is unlikely to
receive any proceeds from a foreclosure sale of the home. See id. A borrower will
typically lose any existing equity in a foreclosure because the lender has little or no
incentive to bid more than the amount of the debt and because third parties rarely
purchase at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 968-71.
179 Id. at 967. Many states impose limitations on the right of a mortgage lender to
seek a deficiency judgment, with limitations ranging from procedural requirements
to anti-deficiency statutes. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, §§ 8.1-8.3.
Anti-deficiency statutes may prohibit a deficiency judgment altogether under certain
circumstances or limit the amount of a deficiency to the difference between the debt
and the value of the foreclosed property. Id. § 8.3.
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ers may buy a home at foreclosure for substantially less than its
fair market value, sell the house for significantly more, and still
maintain a deficiency suit against the borrower though the lender
has been made whole.18 0 Borrowers, therefore, can face both
loss of equity and a deficiency judgment. Nevertheless, because
inadequacy of bid price is not unique to power of sale foreclo-
sure, 181 I do not address it further in this Article.
A homeowner's lack of opportunity for a hearing shifts the
burden of initiating suit onto the homeowner. This is the primary
concern I address in this Article. Where state action makes pro-
cedural due process applicable to power of sale foreclosure, due
process entitles the mortgagors to "a hearing at which [the mort-
gagors] could challenge.., the legal right of [the mortgagee] to
foreclose."'' The mortgagor's right to bring suit to enjoin a
foreclosure probably does not satisfy constitutional requirements
for opportunity to be heard. 183 Most power of sale foreclosures
are nonetheless valid because state action is absent.
C. Propriety of Power of Sale Foreclosure in Contractor-
Connected Home Improvement Loans
Wholly apart from the constitutional issue is the issue of fair-
ness. As a matter of public policy, should home improvement
lenders who have purchased a loan from, or who have a relation-
ship with, the home improvement contractor be permitted to
foreclose on a person's home without prior hearing? Answering
this question requires balancing the benefits of the power of sale
foreclosure remedy to such lenders against the costs to home-
owners. 18$ First, the cost of power of sale foreclosure is less than
180 See Johnson, supra note 169, at 966-67. In states with anti-deficiency legisla-
tion or a statutory right of redemption, a lender has little incentive to make a "low-
ball" bid. Id. at 967-68.
181 See Nelson, supra note 169, at 248; Washburn, supra note 169, at 847.
182 Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D. Me. 1976); see also Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1975) ("[A]t a minimum due process
requires the trustee to make an initial showing before the clerk or similar neutral
official that the mortgagor is in default under the obligation; the mortgagor must of
course be afforded the opportunity to rebut and defend the charges." (citation
omitted)).
183 See Turner, 389 F. Supp. at 1259; Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp.
377, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp.
594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). But see
Laughlin v. Walters, 718 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1983); Fitzgerald v. Cleland, 650 F.2d 360
(1st Cir. 1981); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
184 While no such balancing has been performed with regard to power of sale
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the cost of judicial foreclosure, although the cost differential is
difficult to measure and varies from state to state.185 Lower fore-
closure costs may be passed on to borrowers in the form of lower
interest rates and increased availability of credit. These benefits
may be outweighed if power of sale foreclosure imposes a sub-
stantial hardship on homeowners. The availability of power of
sale foreclosure imposes costs on society if it permits lenders to
foreclose in instances in which a homeowner has a valid defense
to payment that she would raise in a judicial foreclosure hearing
but not with a power of sale foreclosure. 186 Since at least some
instances of wrongful foreclosure would be avoided if judicial
foreclosure were required, the question becomes the frequency
with which these instances occur.
To evaluate the contribution made by power of sale foreclo-
sure to the frequency of wrongful foreclosures, several questions
should be considered. First, how often do lenders attempt to
foreclose despite a homeowner's valid defense to foreclosure?
Second, how often do homeowners with a valid defense fail to
raise that defense by seeking to enjoin a power of sale foreclo-
sure? Finally, how often would homeowners with a valid defense
appear and raise that defense in a judicial foreclosure?'87 While
no concrete answers to these questions exist, a meaningful dis-
cussion of each is still possible.
foreclosure, a number of commentators have discussed the propriety and constitu-
tionality of the Article 9 remedy of self-help repossession in this manner. See Ed-
ward A. Dauer & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized
Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 116 (1973); James J. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor
Pay Even More, 1973 Wisc. L. REV. 503, 511; Mark G. Yudof, Reflections on Private
Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 954, 963 (1974);
see also Robert W. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analy-
sis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973) (focusing on the benefit side of the equation).
185 Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 413 (1968) [hereinafter Cost and Time].
186 Power of sale foreclosure may also impose costs on homeowners if it is less
likely to result in a fair bid price. Judicial involvement in the judicial foreclosure
process may increase the likelihood of a fair bid. However, anti-deficiency legisla-
tion and statutory redemption schemes adopted in connection with power of sale
foreclosure can also increase the likelihood of a fair bid. Adequacy of bid price is
not the focus of the Article.
187 These questions are based on similar questions asked by Professor White in his
evaluation of the remedy of self-help repossession. See White, supra note 184, at
512.
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1. Prevalence of Defenses to Foreclosure
Because homeowners do not always raise valid defenses to
foreclosure of a home improvement loan,88 measuring the prev-
alence of such defenses is difficult. In some cases, homeowners
may have defenses to payment based on the loan transaction it-
self. 18 9 In addition, because of the FTC's Holder in Due Course
Rule, homeowners are permitted to raise defenses based on the
failure of the contractor to complete improvements in a satisfac-
tory manner or based on fraud or unconscionability in the under-
lying home improvement contract. While anecdotal evidence
indicates that defenses to payment are quite common, 190 no em-
pirical evidence is available.191 The number of complaints made
to Better Business Bureaus about home improvement compa-
nies 192 provides some indication that defenses to payment based
on problems in the underlying transaction frequently arise. Fur-
thermore, studies of consumers sued by their creditors show that
a substantial number may have complete or partial defenses to
payment. 19
3
2. Failure of Homeowners to Raise Valid Defenses
In jurisdictions in which a home improvement lender may
foreclose by power of sale, the only means for a homeowner to
188 See discussion infra part IV.C.2-3.
189 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Such defenses could include lack
of consideration, payment, and usury.
190 See supra part I.A.
191 Similarly, no empirical evidence was available with regard to the prevalence of
defenses to repossession among car buyers, but several commentators nevertheless
discussed the issue. Professors Johnson and White concluded that defenses were
uncommon. See Johnson, supra note 184, at 114 ("[O]nly a small proportion of
consumers in default appear to have a valid defense."); White, supra note 184, at 528
("[T]hat is not to say that I believe that a large number of debtors whose cars are
repossessed have significant bona fide claims to assert against their sellers. Indeed
my guess would be the opposite .... "). Professors Dauer, Gilhool, and Yudof dis-
agreed with the conclusions reached by Johnson and White. See Dauer & Gilhool,
supra note 184, at 143 ("[Johnson's] conclusion patently is non sequitur."); Yudof,
supra note 184, at 969 ("[T]hough I have no more empirical proof than Professor
White offers, it seems to me likely that breaches of warranty and other defects in the
seller's performance are much more likely than he admits.").
192 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19 3 See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN
DEFAULT 91-121 (1974); Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments
Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 DENy. U. L. REV. 357, 384 (1990).
These defenses include violations of express and implied warranties, fraud, uncon-
scionability, and violations of debt collection laws. See CAPLOVITZ, supra, at 91-121;
Sterling & Schrag, supra, at 377-84.
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assert a defense to foreclosure is by bringing suit to enjoin the
foreclosure. This burden creates a major obstacle for homeown-
ers for a number of reasons. First, consumers tend not to assert
their legal rights when doing so requires them to initiate litiga-
tion.194 Homeowners may not be sufficiently sophisticated to
know that a valid defense will prevent a foreclosure, 95 or they
may be cynical about their own ability to prevail against the fore-
closing lender.'96 In addition, they may be intimidated by the
legal process or by the prospect of hiring an attorney. 97
Second, the costs of initiating litigation may be prohibitive.1 98
A suit to obtain an injunction is not easily brought pro se,19 yet
homeowners most often affected by home improvement scams
are the very members of society who may have the least access to
legal services. While middle or upper income homeowners may
have the resources to retain an attorney to prevent foreclosure,
less affluent homeowners are unlikely to be able to afford an at-
torney. Although the poor have access to free legal services in
many communities, low income homeowners may have incomes
too great to qualify for such services.2 °° Thus, homeowners fac-
ing foreclosure may be caught in the middle, with incomes too
low to afford an attorney but too high to make them eligible for
free legal services. 20 1 Even those who would qualify for free
legal services might not be aware these services are available.2 °2
Furthermore, a suit to enjoin a foreclosure, even with a claim
against the lender, is unlikely to produce damages which would
194 Cooter & Rubin, supra note 153, at 81, 116.
195 Id.
196 See White, supra note 184, at 528.
197 See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 153, at 81.
198 See generally id. at 80-81 (discussing the effect of litigation costs on a con-
sumer's decision to pursue litigation); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 108-10,
119-24 (1974) (discussing the advantages in litigation that repeat players, such as
finance companies, have over "one-shotters," such as consumer debtors).
199 See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
200 The Legal Services Corporation establishes the maximum income levels for
persons eligible for free legal assistance. Income Level for Individuals Eligible for
Assistance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,751 (1997). Generally, the maximum annual income for
an individual to be eligible is $9,863 and for a family of four to be eligible is $20,063.
Id. at 12,752.
201 Approximately half of the consumers interviewed by Sterling and Schrag had
incomes too high for them to qualify for free legal services in Washington D.C. Ster-
ling & Schrag, supra note 193, at 386-87 n.106.
202 Four of the fifteen consumers interviewed by Sterling and Schrag were not
aware of the availability of free legal services. Id. at 386.
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warrant an attorney's acceptance of the case on a contingent fee
basis.20 3
Finally, the nature of the injunction action creates problems
for homeowners. To prevent a pending foreclosure, the home-
owner must obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO), a pre-
liminary injunction, or both. In addition, the homeowner must
ultimately obtain a permanent injunction based on the invalidity
of the debt. Most jurisdictions require a plaintiff seeking either a
TRO or a preliminary injunction to post a bond or other secur-
ity.2°4 The bonding requirement increases the cost of an already
expensive action. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction or
TRO, the homeowner must typically show irreparable harm and
some probability that the homeowner will prevail on the mer-
its.20 5 If foreclosure is imminent, a homeowner may attempt to
obtain a TRO. While a TRO may be issued in an ex parte hear-
ing, its typical duration is only ten days to two weeks.20 6 A pre-
liminary injunction usually will be required to prevent a lender
from foreclosing after expiration of the TRO and before a per-
manent injunction can be obtained. While a preliminary injunc-
tion survives until final judgment on the merits, unless dissolved
earlier, securing a preliminary injunction requires an evidentiary
hearing.20 7 If the homeowner is successful in obtaining a prelimi-
nary injunction, then the homeowner can avoid foreclosure until
a hearing is scheduled for the permanent injunction. In an action
to obtain a permanent injunction, the homeowner must prove a
valid defense to the debt.20 8 Therefore, enjoining a foreclosure is
likely to require two evidentiary hearings and at least some dis-
covery to obtain evidence. If there is a dispute about the quality
of the home improvements, the homeowner will probably need
testimony from an expert witness. Obtaining injunctive relief to
203 But see Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d 1335 (Ala.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 301 (1992) (holding a lender liable for over six million dollars on the basis
that the contractor was acting as the lender's agent in perpetrating a fraud against
the borrower); Marsh, supra note 91, at 20-25 (discussing the Union Mortgage case).
204 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.11(3) (2d ed. 1993). The cost of the
bond is not refundable even if the homeowner ultimately prevails in preventing a
foreclosure.
205 See id. § 2.11(2).
206 /d. § 2.11(1).
207 Id. The hearing on a preliminary injunction is usually attenuated, with evi-
dence by affidavit typically permitted. Id.
208 The homeowner must also show that the legal remedy is not adequate. See id.
§ 2.5(2). Typically, this showing is not difficult because each tract of land is assumed
to be unique.
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prevent a foreclosure is thus expensive and most certainly re-
quires the assistance of an attorney. Because of the difficulty of
asserting a defense to payment in this manner, homeowners may
instead continue making payments despite the defense or, worse,
may lose their homes to foreclosure.
3. Likelihood of Homeowners to Raise Defenses in a Judicial
Foreclosure
The extra costs of judicial foreclosure should be imposed on
lenders only if homeowners are more likely to appear and raise
defenses in a judicial foreclosure action than they are to seek to
enjoin a power of sale foreclosure. Studies show that a great per-
centage of consumers sued by their creditors fail to appear.2 °9
Some commentators theorize that consumers who default have
no defense to payment.210 However, other reasons explain the
frequency of default. For example, consumers may default be-
cause they have not received a summons, because they do not
understand the summons, because they are unable to miss work,
or because they have been advised by a court clerk or the credi-
tor's attorney not to appear.211 The propensity of consumer
debtors to default when sued raises the question of whether
homeowners would appear to raise a defense against a foreclo-
sure. If homeowners are not likely to appear, then the extra
costs imposed by judicial foreclosure are not warranted.
Despite the propensity of consumer debtors not to appear
2 0 9
See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 193, at 201-11; Johnson, supra note 184, at 114
(citing a National Commission on Consumer Finance Press Release, May 5, 1972);
Sterling & Schrag, supra note 193, at 361; see also Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HoFsTRA L. REv. 533, 554 (1992) (finding that tenants defaulted in almost 85% of
the eviction actions covered by the study); Robert W. Doggett & Stefan H. Krieger,
"Don't Bother Coming": A Study of Eviction Court in Dallas County 88 (May, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (finding that tenants defaulted in
about three-fourths of the eviction actions covered by the study).
210 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 184, at 114; White, supra note 184, at 528; see
also CAPLOVITZ, supra note 193, at 205:
A number of judges in these courts are well aware of the extraordinarily
high proportion of default judgments in consumer actions... but they are
not alarmed, for they reason that this indicates merely that the debtor
knows he is at fault and sees no point of risking further court costs by
making an appearance and asking for a trial.
In fact, a number of consumers may have partial or complete defenses to payment.
See supra notes 190-93.
211 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 193, at 205; Sterling and Schrag, supra note 193, at
370.
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when sued, more homeowners would appear at a judicial hearing
to assert defenses than would initiate an action for an injunction.
First, because a judicial foreclosure typically takes more time
than a power of sale foreclosure,212 a homeowner will have more
time to retain an attorney to raise defenses in a judicial foreclo-
sure action. Second, a homeowner without an attorney is more
likely to be able to defend a foreclosure action than to bring an
action for an injunction.213 Therefore, those homeowners who
cannot afford an attorney or qualify for free legal services would
be more likely able to raise defenses. In addition, other costs
associated with bringing an action for an injunction, such as filing
and service fees and the cost of a bond, would not fall on the
homeowner. Furthermore, other factors, such as ignorance of
the availability of a defense or fear of the legal system, which
tend to inhibit homeowners from initiating a lawsuit, could be
minimized by safeguards built into the foreclosure procedure. 214
D. Distinguishing the Contractor-Connected Home
Improvement Loan
The purpose of this Article is not to recommend the elimina-
tion of power of sale foreclosure. Foreclosure without a judicial
hearing is appropriate in connection with loans made to sophisti-
cated borrowers such as commercial real estate borrowers. It is
reasonable to assume that these borrowers could hire an attorney
to enjoin a foreclosure if necessary and that they would prefer
the lower interest rates presumably available when lenders can
foreclose in the least expensive manner.
Foreclosure without judicial hearing may also be appropriate
in those circumstances in which defenses to foreclosure are rare.
Home purchase money financing provided by an institutional
lender is an example of such a situation. Since this type of lender
has no relationship with from the seller of the home, any
problems arising from the underlying purchase transaction are
not appropriately raised against the lender. Defenses arise if the
lender did not in fact lend the money, if the borrower is not in
default, or if there is fraud or unconscionability in the loan trans-
212 See Cost and Time, supra note 185, at 414 (1968). A power of sale foreclosure
may be completed in a matter of weeks in some states. Id.; see, e.g., TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).
213 See Nelson, supra note 169, at 33.
214 See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 75, 1996]
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing
action itself. While these defenses do arise, they are probably
rare. 1 Even in home improvement financing, foreclosure with-
out judicial hearing may be appropriate for lenders without any
relationship to the contractor. Again, problems in the underlying
transaction are not appropriate to raise, and other defenses are
rare.
Power of sale foreclosure is inappropriate in those circum-
stances where a contractor is likely to be paid despite nonper-
formance or where there is a likelihood of fraud or
unconscionability. The best indicator of these circumstances is
the existence of a relationship between the lender and contrac-
tor, a relationship usually found in the system of home improve-
ment financing available to many poor, minority, and elderly
homeowners.2 16 Therefore, power of sale foreclosure should not
be permitted when such a relationship exists.
V
SHIFTING THE BURDENS
The burdens of proof and initiating suit should be placed on
the lender attempting to collect a home improvement loan
through foreclosure if the lender has a relationship with the con-
tractor. In order to shift the burden of proof, contractors and
lenders should be prohibited from converting a homeowner's
conditional payment obligation under a home improvement con-
tract into an unconditional payment obligation evidenced by a
215 A purchase money loan can also be distinguished from home improvement
loan on the basis that a purchase money loan permits the purchase of the home in
the first place. There are distinctions made in consumer finance between purchase
money loans and non-purchase money loans. For example, creditors are no longer
permitted to take non-purchase money security interests in certain types of house-
hold goods. See 16 C.F.R, § 444.2(a)(4) (1996). While a home improvement loan
has something of the characteristics of a purchase money loan, since loan proceeds
are to be used to increase the value of the house, the lien not only attaches to the
improvements but to the entire home. Therefore, a foreclosure of a home improve-
ment loan permits a lender to take equity in the home that predated the home im-
provement loan.
216 See supra part I.B. A sophisticated homeowner, who approaches several con-
tractors for estimates and arranges financing independently, is unlikely to become
the victim of a home improvement scam. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
The FTC reached a similar finding when it considered extending the Holder in Due
Course Rule to consumer loans made by lenders without any relationship to the
seller of goods and services. See 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506 (1975). The FTC determined
there was not sufficient evidence of unfairness to consumers in connection with such
loans to warrant extending the rule. See 53 Fed. Reg. 44,456 (1988).
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promissory note.217 If the homeowner's obligation were evi-
denced only by the home improvement contract, the home-
owner's obligation to pay would be conditioned on the
contractor's performance. In order to shift the burden of initiat-
ing suit, power of sale foreclosure by a home improvement
lender with a relationship to the contractor should be prohibited.
Home improvement lenders would then be required to foreclose
judicially and to prove performance by the contractor in order to
foreclose.
The burdens of proof and initiating suit should be shifted to
the lender if the contractor originated the loan or if there is a
relationship between the lender and the contractor. The FTC's
Holder in Due Course Rule and the 1974 version of the UC3 each
provide a model for defining the required relationship between
the lender and contractor.218 The Holder in Due Course Rule
applies where the seller "(1) refers consumers to the creditor or
(2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract, or
business arrangement. 219 This definition may be too broad.22°
The UC3 lists the relationships that trigger its operation, 221 but
this list may be incomplete. For example, the UC3 would not ap-
ply where the seller arranges financing for the consumer but does
not receive a commission or referral fee.2 22 A preferable ap-
proach would be a list similar to that in the UC3 but broadened
to cover other situations in which abuse is likely. One factor that
should make a loan contractor-connected is the lender's dis-
bursement of loaned funds directly to the contractor without di-
rection from the homeowner.223
217 This prohibition would also shift the burden of pleading. See supra note 117
and accompanying text.
218 See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1996); U.C.C.C. § 3.405(1) (1974).
219 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1996). "Contract" is defined as "[a]ny oral or written
agreement, formal or informal, between a creditor and a seller, which contemplates
or provides for cooperative or concerted activity in connection with the sale of goods
or services to consumers or the financing thereof." Id. § 433.1(f). "Business ar-
rangement" is defined as "[any understanding, procedure, course of dealing, or ar-
rangement, formal or informal, between a creditor and a seller, in connection with
the sale of goods or services to consumers or the financing thereof." Id. § 433.1(g).
220 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 62, § 5.30, at 361 n.25 ("This language
appears to be broad enough to cover virtually every purchase-money loan in which
the lender knows what the use of the funds will be ... .
221 U.C.C.C. § 3.405(1) (1974).
222 Id. § 3.405(1)(a).
223 Without this factor, unscrupulous lenders would be encouraged to make direct
loans to homeowners with equity in their homes and then to disburse funds to an
unrelated contractor without regard to whether work was completed. Such loans
[Vol. 75, 1996]
New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing
Shifting the burdens of proof and initiating suit would give
homeowners substantially more protection against home im-
provement scams. A lender seeking to foreclose would have to
commence a judicial foreclosure action against the homeowner.
The homeowner would then receive notice of a hearing to deter-
mine the lender's right to foreclose. At the hearing, the lender
would be required to make a prima facie showing that the con-
tractor had substantially performed. The homeowner could pro-
vide evidence to rebut the lender's showing and would have the
opportunity to raise defenses to payment such as fraud, uncon-
scionability, or breach of warranty.
Certainly some homeowners with valid defenses to payment
would fail to appear at the hearing and thus be subject to a de-
fault judgment.224 This problem could be minimized, however,
by providing information to the homeowner and by tailoring the
process to meet the needs of a pro se defendant. For example,
the law could require that the summons be worded in plain Eng-
lish225 and be accompanied by a brochure containing information
about valid defenses to payment.226 In addition, homeowners
could be excused from filing a written answer and could be re-
quired to appear at the courthouse only once.227 These types of
procedures would help eliminate factors such as fear of the legal
system and ignorance of the availability of defenses that discour-
age consumers from appearing at a judicial hearing.
Without eliminating promissory notes and power of sale fore-
closure altogether in home improvement financing, it would be
impossible to shift the burdens of proof and initiating suit in
every case. Some contractors and lenders would evidence con-
tractor-connected home improvement loans with promissory
would fall outside the operation of the FTC Rule as well as any prohibition against
promissory notes and power of sale foreclosure.
224 Although a foreclosure could proceed only if the lender made a prima facie
showing of substantial performance, a default judgment could nevertheless be en-
tered if the lender had fabricated evidence or if the homeowner's defense was unre-
lated to performance. My proposal does not shift the burden of proof with respect
to other defenses such as fraud or unconscionability.
225 See CAPLOViTZ, supra note 193, at 208-09 (comparing the wording of sum-
monses in different states).
226 Sterling and Schrag suggest a similar brochure in consumer debt collection
actions. Sterling & Schrag, supra note 193, at 388-89.
227 See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 193, at 201-02 (discussing the complexity of re-
sponding to a summons in some states); Sterling & Schrag, supra note 193, at 360
(discussing a simplified procedure).
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notes despite a prohibition.2" Some lenders would proceed with
power of sale foreclosures of such loans despite a prohibition.
Only action by the homeowner, with the burden to prove the
applicability of the prohibitions, would prevent foreclosure in
such cases. This problem should, however, be minimal. While
many home improvement contractors are small "fly-by-night"
operations, frequently changing addresses, corporate identities,
and even states in which they operate,22 9 home improvement
lenders, because of the nature of their business, are more likely
to be highly capitalized institutional lenders operating on a state-
wide or even nationwide basis.23° Small or local home improve-
ment lenders generally obtain capital by selling their loans to
large institutional lenders or by using the loans as collateral to
borrow from the larger lenders.23' While disreputable contrac-
tors may blatantly disregard the law, home improvement lenders
and the purchasers of their loans are likely to operate within the
letter of the law.
The problem of contractors or lenders disregarding statutory
prohibitions against promissory notes and power of sale foreclo-
sure could be minimized with strong punitive measures directed
at lenders as well as contractors.232 For example, the statute
could include a provision for attorneys' fees and treble damages
in the event of violation. A provision for attorneys' fees would
increase the likelihood that homeowners could afford attorneys
to help them enforce their rights. A treble damages provision
would discourage lenders from violating the prohibition. In addi-
tion, any promissory note executed in violation of the statute
could be void, regardless of whether home improvements were
completed in a satisfactory manner. Finally, punitive measures
228 Some lenders do engage in prohibited practices. For example, although the
Texas Constitution prohibits liens against homestead property for purposes other
than purchase money, taxes, or home improvements, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50,
some lenders lend money to homeowners for other purposes and document their
liens as being for purchase money or improvements. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note
10, at 28 n.4.
229 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
230 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 308 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts); Forrester,
supra note 17, at 421-23.
231 See Senate Banking Comm. Hearings, supra note 15, at 308 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts); Forrester,
supra note 17, at 421-23.
232 The FIC Rule, on the other hand, is enforceable only against sellers. See
supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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could be made applicable to subsequent holders of any loan
made in violation of the statute, which would cause purchasers of
home improvement loans to police the activities of the originat-
ing lenders.
A prohibition against promissory notes and power of sale fore-
closure in contractor-connected home improvement loans would
probably discourage these types of loans. Home improvement
lenders would be encouraged to make direct loans to homeown-
ers purchasing improvements from contractors without any rela-
tionship to the lender. Furthermore, lenders would be
encouraged to make advances payable jointly to the homeowner
and contractor rather than directly to the contractor,233 providing
protection to homeowners against nonperformance by the con-
tractor. Despite the disadvantages of maintaining a relationship
with a contractor, some lenders would undoubtedly do so for
marketing purposes. However, lenders that maintained relation-
ships with contractors would be encouraged to police the activi-
ties of the contractors since foreclosure would require proof of
substantial completion.
Shifting the burdens of proof and initiating suit to lenders
would increase the costs to lenders of enforcing contractor-con-
nected loans. Undoubtedly, some of the increased cost would be
passed on to consumers in the form of higher interest rates.
However, because of the frequency of abusive transactions in
connection with home improvements and the tremendous loss to
the homeowner who is the victim of a home improvement scam,
the higher cost can be justified. Furthermore, the cost of loans
made by lenders without a relationship to a contractor would not
be affected.
CONCLUSION
Current law, which places the burden to prove defenses to pay-
ment on the maker of a promissory note and which permits
power of sale foreclosure, seems to be based upon an assumption
that defenses to payment are rare. This assumption may be cor-
rect with respect to an ordinary mortgage loan not related to any
underlying home improvement contract. The assumption is not
valid with respect to a home improvement loan made by a lender
with a relationship to the contractor. Scams, like the one perpe-
233 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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trated against James Hogan, occur too frequently to be ignored.
When these scams do occur, they cause substantial harm to the
homeowners affected. To protect vulnerable homeowners, prom-
issory notes and power of sale foreclosure must be prohibited in
contractor-connected home improvement loans.
